Brexit, Representative Democracy and Constitutional Reform since 1997
Author(s)
Vassiliki Christou
Language
English
Pages
54
2018/ Vol. 30, No. 3, (109)
Type
Digital edition
5.00 €

Brexit, Representative Democracy and Constitutional Reform since 1997

Vassiliki Christou

PhD University of Heidelberg, Law Faculty

In this paper I shed light on Brexit as a crisis of representative democracy in Britain. Brexit is, to some extent, the result of a representational crisis; simultaneously it is a factor causing further destabilisation and disintegration of representative institutions. The institutional thinking underpinning Brexit illustrates a tendency to return to an earlier, less mature form of representation, “mandate representation”, and to depart from the post-war model of what I call “party representation”. I tried to show how a path to Brexit started being charted since 1997 on an institutional level by the constitutional reforms of Tony Blair, whereas constitutional reform since 2010 has further shifted the balance towards direct democracy. In this light, I tried to read Miller as an effort to restore the role of Parliament as a deliberative forum in a context of a dynamically evolving direct relationship between the People and the executive power.

Dans cet article, j’ai mis en lumière le Brexit comme étant une crise de la démocratie représentative en Grande-Bretagne. Le Brexit est, dans une certaine mesure, le résultat d’une crise de la représentation; en même temps, c’est un facteur de déstabilisation et de désintégration des institutions représentatives. La pensée institutionnelle qui sous-tend le Brexit illustre une tendance à revenir à une forme de représentation plus ancienne et moins mature, la “représentation mandatée”, et à s’écarter du modèle d’après-guerre de ce que j’appelle la “représentation des partis”. J’ai essayé de montrer comment les réformes constitutionnelles de Tony Blair ont commencé à tracer la voie vers Brexit dès 1997 sur le plan institutionnel, alors que la réforme constitutionnelle de 2010 a encore fait pencher la balance vers la démocratie directe. Sous cet angle, j’ai essayé de lire l’arrêt Miller comme un effort de restaurer le rôle du Parlement en tant que forum délibératif dans un contexte de relation directe, évoluant de façon dynamique, entre le Peuple et le pouvoir exécutif.

* The present paper has been written during the time I spent as a Visiting College Research Associate at Wolfson College, University of Cambridge (June-August 2018). I am grateful to Professor Spyridon Flogaitis for the encouragement and support. I am indebted to Professor David Feldman for the guidance and discussions during this research stay. I have also profited a lot from the discussions during the 2nd International Conference Europe in Discourse Agendas of Reform (HAEC, September 21-23, 2018), where I presented an earlier draft of part of this paper. Of course, I am alone responsible for the views and mistakes in this paper. I am also thankful to my friends, Maria Thalia Carras and Markos Komondouros, for proofreading and commenting this paper.

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